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SNYDER V. PHELPS
"[T]he best test of truth is the sPower of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market . .." Since Justice Holmes penned these words in
1919, his "marketplace of ideas" analogy has supported the right to free speech
and ultimately has become foundational to America's Free Speech Clause
jurisprudence. Juxtaposed against the right to speak freely, however, is the right
to protection from harm that others' "marketplace" expressions can cause.
3
Although the United States Supreme Court has validated such protection by
recognizing common law torts for speech-caused harm, allowing recovery of
damages without unduly encroaching on First Amendment rights requires careful
judicial balancing of parties' interests.4
Last year, Snyder v. Phelps5 required the Fourth Circuit to determine an
appropriate balance between these competing interests when the appellants
asserted that a jury's decision finding them liable for intrusion upon seclusion,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy violated their
First Amendment right to publicly proclaim "God's hatred of America for its
tolerance of homosexuality. 6 The Fourth Circuit held that in spite of the
"distasteful and repugnant" nature of the appellants' speech, the First
Amendment protected the speech and "the district court erred in declining to
award judgment as a matter of law.",
7
On March 10, 2006, Fred W. Phelps, Sr., Shirley L. Phelps-Roper, Rebekah
A. Phelps-Davis, and four of Phelps's grandchildren picketed the funeral of
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder at St. John's Catholic Church in
Westminster, Maryland. 8 Fred W. Phelps is the founder and sole pastor of
Westboro Baptist Church in Topeka, Kansas, where "his children, grandchildren,
[and] in-laws" comprise fifty of the "approximately sixty or seventy members."
9
"[M]embers of [Phelps's] church practice a fire and brimstone fundamentalist
religious faith" and believe "that God hates homosexuality and hates and
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988) (citing Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes,
J., dissenting)); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2,
at 927-29 (3d ed. 2006).
3. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (recognizing "[t]he
legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel").
4. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341; N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-83.
5. 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3521 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2010) (No.
09-751).
6. See id. at 210-12.
7. Id. at 226.
8. Id. at 211-12 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (D. Md. 2008), rev'd,
580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009)).
9. Id. at 211 (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571).
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punishes America for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in the United
States military." 10 Members of the church assert their beliefs by picketing at
funerals and by publishing their views on the Web site
www.godhatesfags.com.
Signs that Phelps and his family carried at Snyder's funeral "expressed
general messages such as 'God Hates the USA,' 'America is doomed,' 'Pope in
hell,' and 'Fag troops."' 12 Other signs expressed specific messages: "'You're
going to hell,' 'God hates you,' 'Semper fi fags,' and 'Thank God for dead
soldiers. ' ' '13 At the funeral, Phelps and his family neither violated any local
ordinances or police directions regarding the distance of their protests from the
church nor directly confronted any members of the Snyder family. Matthew
Snyder's father first saw the Phelps' signs when he viewed television footage of
the funeral protest. 15 "After returning to Kansas, [Shirley L.] Phelps-Roper
published an 'epic"' titled "'The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew
Snyder"' on www.godhatesfags.com. 6 She included a photograph of the
Maryland protest immediately below the epic's title and subtitled the epic, "The
Visit of Westboro Baptist Church to Help the Inhabitants of Maryland Connect
the Dots! This Epic Adventure Took Place on Friday, March 10, 2006. "17 The
epic declared "that Albert Snyder and his ex-wife 'taught Matthew to defy his
creator,' 'raised him for the devil,' and 'taught him that God was a liar."'
1 8
In 2006, Albert Snyder brought suit against Phelps, Westboro Baptist
Church, Phelps-Roper, and Phelps-Davis, alleging "defamation, intrusion upon
seclusion, publicity given to private life, [intentional infliction of emotional
distress], and civil conspiracy." 19 In October 2007, "the district court granted
summary judgment to the [d]efendants on ... [the] defamation and publicity
given to private life" claims but denied summary judgment on the other three20
claims. The court reasoned that the First Amendment may have protected the
general viewpoint signs such as "America Is Doomed" and "God Hates
America," but the Web site epic and signs such as "Thank God for Dead
Soldiers," "Semper Fi Fags," "You're Going to Hell," and "God Hates You,"
created issues of fact for a jury's determination because they expressed views
10. Id. (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571).
12. Id. at 212 (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 571-72).
15. Id. (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572).
16. Id. (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 212 (quoting 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572) (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. Snyder brought suit against Phelps and Westboro Baptist Church on June 5, 2006. 533
F. Supp. 2d at 572. On February 23, 2007, he added Phelps-Roper and Phelps-Davis as defendants.
Id.
20. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 213.
[VOL. 61 : 657
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arguably specific to the Snyders.21 Thus, it instructed the jury to "determine
whether the [d]efendants' actions were directed specifically at the Snyder
family" and if so, "whether [they] would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, whether they were extreme and outrageous and whether [those] actions
were so offensive and shocking as to not be entitled to First Amendment
protection., 22 On October 31, 2007, the jury found the defendants liable for
intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil
conspiracy; it awarded the plaintiff "$2.9 million in compensatory damages and
a total of $8 million in punitive damages. 23
"[T]he [d]efendants filed post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of
law, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reconsideration and rehearing, a new
trial, relief from judgment, and relief of law and equity," which the district court
denied.24 However, the court did grant the defendants' motion for a remittitur
and decreased the punitive damages award to a total of $2.1 million.
25
In its post-trial opinion on the motion for judgment as a matter of law and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district court held that the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment did not categorically protect the defendants'
actions, that it had properly submitted the plaintiff s claims to the jury, and that
sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings that the defendants intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff and invaded his privacy. 26 The court
reasoned that the First Amendment did not categorically protect the defendants'
actions because "'not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance' 27 and
"the First Amendment interest in protecting speech must be balanced against a
state's interest in protecting its residents from tortious injury. 28
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered (1) whether the district court erred
in allowing the jury to consider First Amendment legal issues and (2) whether
the First Amendment protected the defendants' Maryland protest and Web site
epic. 29 Because the appeal involved First Amendment issues, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the district court's conclusions de novo.
30
Regarding the first issue, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred
in allowing the jury to determine whether the First Amendment protected the
31defendants' speech. Citing the district court's instructions to first determine if
21. Id. at 214 (citing 533 F. Supp. 2d at 578) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id. at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 215-16.
26. 533 F. Supp. 2d at 576-82.
27. Id. at 576 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758 (1985)).
28. Id. at 577 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
29. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217. The defendants raised various other issues on appeal, but the
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the defendants' speech was "'directed specifically at the Snyder family"' and
then determine if it was so "'offensive and shocking as to not be entitled to First
Amendment protection,' 32 the Fourth Circuit held that the court "fatally erred"
by permitting the jury to decide a legal issue-the scope of Free Speech Clause
protection.33 Although the district court's faulty submission of legal questions to
the jury entitled the defendants to a vacation of judgment and a new trial, the
Fourth Circuit noted that a new trial would be unnecessary if it determined that
the First Amendment protected the defendants' speech as a matter of law.34
Regarding the second issue, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court
employed a faulty legal standard to evaluate the defendants' First Amendment
35 36claims and that the Free Speech Clause protected the defendants' actions.
Criticizing the district court's nearly singular reliance on one Supreme Court
decision, 3 the Fourth Circuit reviewed key decisions addressing the First
Amendment's interaction with tort law and grounded its opinion in a line of
cases ignored by the court below.
38
First, the Fourth Circuit established that state tort litigation between private
parties is not immune from the constraints of the First Amendment.
39
Furthermore, although early precedent addressed the First Amendment's
application specifically to the tort of defamation,40 later precedent broadened its
application to any damages sought for "reputational, mental, or emotional injury
allegedly resulting from [a] defendant's speech., 41 Next, the Fourth Circuit
recognized that the First Amendment may protect defendants from defamation
claims based on the plaintiffs status as a public or private figure. 42 Finally, the
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 221-22.
35. Id. at 222.
36. Id. at 226.
37. Id. at 222. The case was Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
38. See Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217-21.
39. Id. at 217.
40. Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
41. Id. at218.
42. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-46; Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80). In New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prevents public officials from
recovering damages against a defendant for alleged defamation unless the official can prove the
defendant made its statements with "actual malice." 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court reasoned that
"[a] rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions"
would deter protected speech. Id. at 279. Later, Chief Justice Warren argued that "public figures"
must meet the actual malice standard. Curtis Publ'g, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). In
Gertz, the Court held that each state could determine the appropriate level of proof necessary for a
private figure to recover from a media defendant, provided it did not hold defendants strictly liable.
418 U.S. at 347. The Court reasoned that while the actual malice standard was appropriate for
public officials because they had "voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk" of inaccurate
characterization and enjoyed substantial access to "channels of effective communication" through
which to combat inaccuracies, such a standard was unrealistic for private figures, even if the alleged
[VOL. 61 : 657
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court explored a line of decisions focusing on "the type of [allegedly harmful]
speech" rather than on the plaintiffs public or private figure status.43
Specifically, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,4 the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment did not protect a media defendant against defamation
allegations by a private figure when the defendant made statements that a
reasonable person could conclude were "actual facts. 45 In Milkovich, a wrestling
coach brought a defamation action against a newspaper after it accused him of
46lying to a state athletics council. The newspaper attempted to prevent recovery
by asserting that Gertz implied categorical First Amendment protection for
statements of opinion4 7 and that the First Amendment barred it from liability
because its statements were "opinion" rather than "fact., 48 The Court rejected the
newspaper's categories of opinion and fact, however, 49 and instead asked
"whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements... impl[ied]
an assertion" of actual fact about the plaintiff.50 Finding the statements
"sufficiently factual to be . . . proved true or false,, 5 1 the Court reversed the
decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals and remanded the case.52 The Court
reasoned that by establishing a reasonableness standard instead of relying on the
"artificial dichotomy between opinion and fact," it would more adequately
protect the "breathing space which [f]reedoms of expression require in order to
survive. 53 The Court specifically noted two types of constitutionally protected
speech upon which its holding did not infringe: (1) media statements regarding
defamation involved a matter of public concern, because they had not exposed themselves to public
scrutiny and likely did not possess substantial resources to "counteract false statements." Id. at 344-
45.
43. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 218-21.
44. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
45. See id. at 20-21.
46. Id. at 3-6. The Court did not require the coach to prove the defendant acted with "actual
malice" because the Ohio Supreme Court's determination that the coach was not a public official
remained the law of the case on that issue. Id. at 10-11 n.5.
47. See id. at 17-18 ("'Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.
However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact."' (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (footnote omitted))).
48. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17-18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 18-19.
50. Id. at 21. Since Milkovich, the Fourth Circuit has applied its "actual facts" standard by
examining the 'verifiability of the statement,"' Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 219 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993)), and "the context and
general tenor of [the statement's] message." Id. The Seventh Circuit has also applied the standard
by examining the objective verifiability of an allegedly defamatory statement. See Haynes v. Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[J]f it is plain that the speaker is expressing a
subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in
possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable.").
51. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
52. Id. at 23.
53. Id. at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
772 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2010]
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issues of public concern that lack a "provably false factual connotation" and (2)
"'rhetorical hyperbole"' and "'imaginative expression"' traditionally present in
America's public discourse.5 a
In Snyder, the Fourth Circuit used Milkovich as its primary analytic
framework and held that a reasonable person could not conclude the defendants
55had stated actual facts about the plaintiff or his son. First, the court examined a
group of the defendants' signs that it deemed similar in content: "'America is
Doomed,' 'God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,' 'Pope in Hell,' 'Fag
Troops,' 'Semper Fi Fags,' 'Thank God for Dead Soldiers,' 'Don't Pray for the
USA,' 'Thank God for IEDs,' 'Priests Rape Boys,' and 'God Hates Fags."'
56
The court held that the First Amendment protected the signs because they dealt
with issues of public concern and did not contain "objectively verifiable facts
about [the plaintiff] or his son. ,57 The court reasoned that because the signs
addressed "homosexuals in the military, the sex-abuse scandal within the
Catholic Church, and the political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens," they involved "issues of social, political, or other interest to the
community," not issues of "'purely private concern. ,,5 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that the signs did not assert objectively verifiable facts about the
plaintiff or his son because they addressed other individuals or national or group59
concerns. The court also held that even if a reader interpreted the signs as
specific to the plaintiff or his son, the First Amendment protected them because
they did not contain objectively verifiable facts about any individual and
expressed only rhetorical hyperbole.60 The court reasoned that the words "God
hates," "Thank God," "Fag Troops," and "Priests Rape Boys" were incapable of
objective verification 61 and that the signs' references to God and terrorist attacks
54. Id. at 20.
55. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 222-26.
56. Id. at 222. The court noted that the district court's post-trial opinion did not address the
following four signs: "Don't Pray for the USA," "Thank God for IEDs," "Priests Rape Boys," and
"God Hates Fags." Id. at 222 n. 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 222-23. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had not specifically
addressed whether the Constitution protected nonmedia statements regarding issues of public
concern that were "not provably false." Id. at 219 n.13. The Fourth Circuit asserted, however, that
any distinction between nonmedia defendants and media defendants is "unstable" and that the First
Amendment equally protects both types of defendants on issues "of public concern that [are not]
provably false." Id.
58. Id. at 223 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
759 (1985)).
59. Id. The court noted that the signs "God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11" and "Don't
Pray for the USA" dealt with national concerns; the signs mentioning "fags," "troops," and "dead
soldiers" referred to groups rather than to a specific individual because the nouns were plural; and
the signs referring to the Pope and to priests addressed individuals clearly unrelated to the plaintiff
and his son. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[VOL. 61 : 657
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amounted to "'loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language' not seriously perceived
as factual.62
Next, the court examined two specific signs: "You're Going to Hell" and
"God Hates You." 63 The court held that the First Amendment protected these
signs because they could "not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts
about any individual. 64 The court reasoned that although readers could
potentially interpret the pronoun "you" to refer either to the plaintiff and his son
or to a collective group, it did not matter to whom the assertions referred because
neither assertion included "provable facts., 65 Furthermore, it reasoned that the
"context and tenor" of the signs communicated their lack of serious factual
assertion: "A distasteful protest sign regarding hotly debated matters of public
concern, such as homosexuality or religion, is not the medium through which a
reasonable reader would expect a speaker to communicate objectively verifiable
facts."
'66
Finally, the court examined the Web site epic and held that the First
Amendment protected its rhetoric because "a reasonable reader would not
understand the [speech] to assert actual facts about either [the plaintiff] or his
son." 67 The court reasoned that although the epic's title, "The Burden of Marine
Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder," could cause a reasonable reader to interpret the
epic's statements as assertions of fact about the plaintiffs son, the Web site and
other aspects of the epic negated such an interpretation because they connected
68the epic to the defendants' general message and protests. The epic's subtitle,
"The Visit of Westboro Baptist Church to Help the Inhabitants of Maryland
Connect the Dots! This Epic Adventure Took Place on Friday, March 10, 2006,"
and a photograph of the Maryland protest included immediately below the epic's
title connected its content to the defendants' Maryland rhetoric.6 9 And the epic's
specific language connected the death of the plaintiffs son to the defendants'
protest activities:
God rose up Matthew for the very purpose of striking him down, so that
God's name might be declared throughout all the earth. He killed
Matthew so that His servants would have an opportunity to preach His
words to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, the Maryland
62. Id. (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)).
63. Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id. The court noted that "[w]hether an individual is 'Going to Hell' or whether God
approves of someone's character could not possibly be subject to objective verification." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 226.
68. Id. at 224-25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2010]
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Legislature, and the whorehouse called St. John Catholic Church at
Westminster where Matthew Snyder fulfilled his calling.70
The court also reasoned that the context and general tenor of the epic
indicated the assertions were rhetorical hyperbole: a recap of the Maryland
protest provided the contextual background for the assertions, the church's Web
site published the epic, and the piece contained "distasteful and offensive words,
atypical capitalization, and exaggerated punctuation., 71 All of these factors
conveyed that the claims were irrational declarations rather than provable
conclusions.7 2 Therefore, because the court found that a reasonable reader could
not interpret the defendants' signs or Web site epic as stating actual facts about
the plaintiff or his son, it held that the First Amendment protected the
defendants' speech.73
The concurrence in Snyder declined to consider the First Amendment issue
addressed by the majority but concurred in the final judgment by holding that the
jury lacked sufficient evidence to support its verdict.
74
First, the concurrence held that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to
conclude that the defendants intruded on the plaintiffs right to seclusion.75 It
noted that "[u]nder Maryland law, an 'intrusion' occurs when there has been
some act that interferes 'into a private place or the invasion of a private seclusion
that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.', 76 Furthermore, an
intrusion implies "'something in the nature of prying"', 77 upon an individual
when he is in a place unexposed to the public.78 The concurrence reasoned that
the defendants' funeral protest did not intrude upon the plaintiffs seclusion
because it took place in a public area, was positioned "approximately 1,000 feet
70. Id. at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 225-26.
74. Id. at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring). The majority did not consider the sufficiency of
evidence argument because only an amicus brief raised the issue. Id. at 216 (majority opinion). The
majority held that although the Supreme Court permits appellate consideration of issues raised only
by amicus, doing so would not comport with Fourth Circuit precedent or the preference of other
circuits. Id. at 216-17. In contrast, the concurrence held that not only did Supreme Court rulings
permit it to consider issues raised only by amicus (and that Fifth Circuit precedents supported that
position), but additional factors in this case compelled it to do so. Id. at 227-28 (Shedd, J.,
concurring). It specifically noted that the defendants had challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
in its trial and post-trial motions, the plaintiff had already responded to the issues raised by the
amicus, and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance required it to avoid ruling on a constitutional
issue if it could dispose of the case on other grounds. Id. at 228.
75. Id. at 231. During trial, the district court instructed the jury that the elements of intrusion
upon seclusion are the following: "(1) An intentional (2) intrusion or prying upon (3) something
which is and is entitled to be private (4) in a manner which is highly offensive to a reasonable
person." Id. at 228-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 229 (quoting Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583, 586 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000)).
77. Id. (quoting Hollander v. Lubow, 351 A.2d 421, 426 (Md. 1976)).
78. See id. (citing Furman, 744 A.2d at 587).
[VOL. 61 : 657
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from the funeral," and stopped during the funeral service; furthermore, the
defendants never met the plaintiff, and the plaintiff could not see the protest.79 It
also reasoned that the television coverage of the defendants' protest did not
intrude on the plaintiffs seclusion because it reported information that was
already public.80 Finally, it reasoned that the Web site epic did not intrude on the
plaintiff's seclusion because the defendants did not direct the epic at the plaintiff;
rather, the plaintiff encountered the epic through an Internet search and his own
choice to read the piece.81 Therefore, the concurrence held that the jury did not
have sufficient evidence to support its conclusion that the defendants intruded on
the plaintiffs right to seclusion.8
2
Secondly, the concurrence held that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to
conclude that the defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the
plaintiff.83 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants inflicted emotional distress
on him because they focused their messages on his family, caused the rerouting
of his son's funeral, and interrupted his grieving process by causing him to worry
that his daughters would see their protest.84 In the concurrence's view,
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Maryland law is a tort that "'is
rarely viable, and is to be used sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that
includes truly outrageous conduct." '8 The concurrence held that although the
defendants' action may have been inappropriate, it was not sufficiently "extreme
and outrageous" to support liability for intentional infliction of emotional
86distress. The concurrence reasoned that the defendants' protest complied with
local regulations, took place in a public area, and did not disrupt the funeral
service; thus, it did not rise to the level of outrageousness needed to recover
under Maryland tort law.8 7 Consequently, the concurrence held that the jury
lacked sufficient evidence to support its findings that the defendants intruded on
79. Id. at 230.
80. Id. at 230 n.1 (citing Hollander, 351 A.2d at 426).
81. Id. at231.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 232. During trial, the district court instructed the jury that the elements for
intentional infliction of emotional distress are the following: "(1) the... conduct was intentional or
reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused emotional distress to
[the plaintiff]; and (4) the emotional distress was severe." Id. at 231.
84. Id. at 232.
85. Id. at 231 (quoting Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 319 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1995)).
86. Id. at 232. To find conduct "extreme and outrageous," the conduct must be "'so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."' Id. at 231 (quoting Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986)).
87. Id. at 232.
2010]
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the plaintiff's right to seclusion or intentionally inflicted emotional distress on
him.88
In Snyder, the Fourth Circuit rooted its holding in firmly established
precedent; thus, the decision has relatively few implications in terms of creating
new constitutional protection for speech. However, the decision's primary effect
of reaffirming existing protections should not be undervalued. Although the
protections provided by the Free Speech Clause of the Constitution are
foundational to American democracy, decisions like Snyder serve to ensure their
continued importance in a world where increased diversity leads to a
multiplication of "marketplace" ideas.
Naturally, the facts in Snyder lead to concerns about the privacy protection
afforded to distinctly personal settings such as funerals.89 Such concern is well-
founded given the frequency with which Westboro Baptist Church members visit
funerals to proclaim their message. 90 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's holding
may empower individuals with other platforms to choose funerals as a venue for
asserting their opinions. The Fourth Circuit's decision correctly notes that
governmental authorities can protect privacy during times of bereavement by
enacting reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions that are content-
neutral. 91 Indeed, the federal government has enacted the Respect for America's
Fallen Heroes Act 92 establishing guidelines for protests of military funerals at
national cemeteries, and at least forty-one states have passed legislation
restricting funeral protests.93 However, as legal scholarship and recent court
decisions indicate, drafting constitutionally appropriate funeral protest legislation
is difficult.94
Regardless of the difficulty that maintaining the Constitution's free speech
protections imposes on those seeking to preserve the privacy rights of the
88. Id. The concurrence also argued that the defendants could not be liable for civil
conspiracy because the "unlawful activity" required to support recovery of damages for civil
conspiracy was a finding of liability on the other claims. Id. n.3.
89. See id at 226; Brief for Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 30-31, Snyder, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-
1026), 2008 WL 2593816; Kara Beil, Note, Funeral Protest Bans: Do They Kill Speech or
Resurrect Respect for the Dead?, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 503, 541 (2008).
90. See Snyder, 580 F.3d at 211.
91. See id. at 226.
92. Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, Pub. L. No. 109-228, 120 Stat. 387 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1387, 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006)).
93. DAVID L. HUDSON JR., FIRST AMENDMENT CTR., FUNERAL PROTESTS (2009),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/assembly/topic.aspxtopic=funeralprotests.
94. See Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007); Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F.
Supp. 2d 612 (N.D. Ohio 2007), affd sub nom. Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356 (6th Cir.
2008); McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral
Picketing Laws andFree Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575, 608-12 (2007); Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A
Time to Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against the Right of Privacy in Funeral
Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295, 312-28 (2008); Beil, supra note 89, at 525-41; Lauren M. Miller,
Comment, A Funeral for Free Speech? Examining the Constitutionality of Funeral Picketing Acts,
44 Hous. L. REV. 1097, 1116-30 (2007).
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grieving, courts should continue to diligently protect each individual's right to
speak freely. Obviously, one would not choose the defendants' rhetoric as
endearing speech with which to champion the ideals of free expression. Yet,
radical expression and the cause of the minority are mainstays of the Free
95 ,96Speech Clause. Holding that the "distasteful and repugnant '  nature of the
defendants' speech places it outside the protections of the First Amendment
might provide temporary solace to the grieving, but it would ultimately restrict
speech to expression that no listener would find offensive. Most importantly, it
would inhibit the pursuit of truth.97 Although accepting the defendants' speech as
constitutionally protected may be difficult, doing so fosters the "free trade in
ideas" essential to the success of America's marketplace. 98
Sarah E. Merkle
95. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359, 369 (1931).
96. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 226.
97. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
"that the best test of truth" is for the government to allow speech to gain acceptance or be rejected in
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